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L Introduction
The current discourse about the great poverty-related problems of our
day, from welfare reform to employment opportuties for low-skilled
workers, is itself so impoverished that we should all welcome the opportunity afforded by this symposium for some frank and careful thinking about
contingent employment. Contingent employment - defined by Professor
Arne L. Kalleberg m his thoughtful paper as the absence of "an explicit or
implicit contract for long-term employment or [a job] m which the mmunum
hours worked can vary in a nonsystematic manner"1 - is an especially
timely subject. Proposals to regulate contingent employment are inextricably
bound up with general concerns about mandated employee benefits, such as
the recent proposal by President Clinton to increase the minimum wage.2 I
have gone on record on several occasions opposing mandated employee
benefits of various kinds and increased regulation of the labor market m general.3 I will argue for restraint in the face of anecdotal clamis that the
* I am grateful to Keith N. Hylton, Jane Rutherford, and Michael Jacobs, for
critically reading earlier drafts of this paper, to Robert Michaelis for research assistance, and
to the DePaul College of Law Research Fund for generous support.
1. Arne L. Kalleberg, Part-Time Work and Workers in the United States: Correlates
and Policy Issues, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv 771 (1995) (quoting Anne E. Polivka &
Thomas Nardone, On the Defnition of "Contingent Work", MONTHLY LAB. REv., Dec. 1989,

at9, 11).
2. See Bruce Bartlett, Tell-Tale Minimum Wage Data, WASH. TIMES (D.C.), Mar.
13, 1995, at 19 (reporting President Clinton's proposed increase m federal mmnum wage
from $4.25 per hour to $5.15 per hour over next two years).
3. See generally Maria O'Brien Hylton, "Parental"Leaves and PoorWomen: Paying
the Pricefor Time Off, 52 U. Prr. L. REv 475 (1991) (asserting possibility that poor, lowskilled working women will bear costs of mandated parental leave benefits); Maria O'Brien
Hylton, Working and Poor- The Increasingly Popular Practice of Excluding Disabled
Employees from Health Care Coverage, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 92 (1994) (opposing
mandated benefits as way to increase coverage of disabled employees).
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contingent work force is in dire need of help and that, implicitly, the federal
government is the best qualified entity to provide the allegedly much needed
assistance. I argue in favor of restraint based on the absence of evidence to
support the existence of a serious problem umque to the contingent work
force. In addition, I will argue that the specific proposals Professor
Kalleberg makes do not look promising, as they are designed simply to mcrease the cost of hiring contingent workers without regard to consequences.
IL.Addressing Threshold Issues
The problems inherent in regulating the market for contingent
employment begin with the definition of "contingent employment."
Professor Kalleberg's definition technically covers a very broad group of
people. Indeed, except for tenured academics and union members, neither
of whom makes up a substantial part of the U.S. work force, virtually
everyone who is employed at-will4 is also, under his defintion, a member
of the contingent work force. Clearly, this is not the target group for those
urging regulation. In spite of such an overly broad definition, the regulatory
impulse today is in fact targeted at the following types of employees: those
who work part time (less than forty hours per week); those who work on a
temporary basis; and contract employees, who are sometimes called
independent consultants.' Each category includes both "high end" (well
paid) and "low end" (poorly paid) workers,6 as well as employees whose
contingent status is voluntary 7
4.

The employer's view of the employment-at-will doctrine was described m an early

case:
May I not dismiss my domestic
May I not refuse to trade with any one?
servant for dealing, or even visiting, where I forbid? And if my domestic, why
not my farm-hand, or my mechanic, or teamster? And, if one of them, then why
not all four? And, if all four, why not a hundred or a thousand of them?

Payne v Western & At. Ry., 81 Tenn. 507, 518 (1884).
5. For further discussion of the heterogeneous nature of the contingent work force, see
Kalleberg, supra note 1, at 771 (noting part-time, temporary, contract, and independent
consultant categories) (citing RICHARD S. BELOUS, THE CONTINGENT ECONOMY: THE GROWTH
OF THE TEMPORARY, PART-TIME AND SUBCONTRACTED WORKFORCE (1989)); Kalleberg, supra
note.l, at 773 (noting heterogeneous nature of contingent work force); id. at 779 (distinguishing
between short-time, secondary, and retention contingent jobs) (citing Chris Tilly, Short Hours,
Short Shrift: Causes and Consequences of Part-TimeEmployment, in NEW POLICIES FOR THE
PART-TIME AND CONTINGENT WORKFORCE

(Virgima L. du Rivage ed., 1992)).

6. See Kalleberg, supra note 1, at 779 (noting distinction between low-paying
"secondary" part-time jobs and relatively higher-paying "retention" part-tune jobs).
7 See id. at 776 (noting existence of both voluntary and involuntary part-time

workers).
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No one doubts that some contingent employees would like to move into
the "core" group - that group which Dr. Belous describes as "part of the
corporate entity "8 Also, many employers undoubtedly use part-time
workers, temporary employees, or contract employees solely to further their
own economic interests. 9 Indeed, there is anecdotal evidence that appears
to support the contention that some employees have been forced from core
to contingent status in order to eliminate their benefits, enhance employer
flexibility, and reduce wages."° It is important to keep in mind, though, that
some contingent workers presumably find other contingent attributes
attractive: scheduling flexibility and control over hours, working conditions,
and job assignments.
Implicit in the move to regulate the contingent market are several false
premises. First, it is simply not true that workers in the "core" group enjoy
relatively more job security While the shrinking unionized sectors represent
an obvious exception, the vast majority of American workers are at-will
employees who dan be fired for any nondiscrinmnatory" reason or for no
reason at all. Second, it is also not true that contingent employees' are
completely ineligible for benefits. In the United States, we have a system
which has traditionally provided benefits via employment. These benefits
are of two types: mandated benefits - such as Medicare, Social Security
8. Richard S. Belous, How Human Resource Systems Adjust to the Shift Toward
Contingent Workers, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 1989, at 8. See also RICHARD S. BELOUS,
THE CONTINGENT ECONOMY: THE GROWTH OF THE TEMPORARY, PART-TIME AND
SUBCONTRACTED WORKFORCE 5-6 (1989) (discussing characteristics of core and contingent

work forces).
9. Why the pursuit of economic self-interest automatically requires a counterbalancing
regulatory response is unclear.
10. See, e.g., Bennett Harrison, The Dark Side of Flexible Production, TECH. REV.,
May/June 1994, at 39, 45 (stating that "[t]he growing use of outside subcontractors
sharpens the divisions between insiders and outsiders and reinforces the long-term trend
toward the polarization of American earnings"); Karen Judd & Sandy M. Pope, The New Job
Squeeze, Ms., May/June 1994, at 86 (discussing growth m contingent employment, with
emphasis on women); Laura McClure, Working the Risk Shift, 58 PROGRESSIVE 23, 26 (1994)
(stating that "[clontingent employment is, by definition, insecure. Turnover is high and
protections are few. Workers are often afraid to complain about or organize against poor
conditions. And so employers get away with murder.").
11. The at-will status of most employees has been modified by the various civil rights
statutes that address employment (ADA, Title VII, ADEA) and by federal and state laws that,
in effect, -create a host of illegal grounds for termination. See generally Richard Epstein, In
Defense of the ContractAt WII, 51 U. CHI. L. REV 947 (1984) (noting that despite regulation
directly regulating employer-employee relations, common-law rules govern large portions of

employer-employee relationslup, and arguing that regulation cannot match benefits of contract
at will).
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(public pension and long term disability), workers' compensation, unemployment insurance, and mmunum wage guarantees under the Fair Labor
Standards Act; 2 and nonmandated, or discretionary benefits - such as
health insurance, long- and short-term disability insurance, life insurance,
and vacations. Employers are often required to provide all mandated
benefits to an. employee, whether or not the employee works a full forty3
hours per week and irrespective of the employee's length of service.'
Contingent workers, it is true, often do not receive health insurance and
other discretionary benefits.' 4 However, the same can be said for so-called
"core" employees because these benefits are by definition discretionary The

point is that with respect to both job security and discretionary benefits,
many "core" workers have no more right to their employment or to health

insurance than members of the contingent work force.
The question is, in a country that links only minimal benefits and job
security to both core and contingent employment, why should we focus

regulatory energies on contingent workers alone? The regulatory proposals
before us today 5 would do nothing to increase the ability of a "core" worker

without health or disability insurance to obtain those protections or even to
hold on to a job. Furthermore, given that some unknown percentage of

contingent workers voluntarily embrace contingent status, presumably
demonstrating a desire for more flexibility than the traditional labor market
12. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
13. Social Security, workers' compensation, and unemployment insurance are common
examples of these types of benefits.
14. See Kalleberg, supra note 1, at 782-85 (comparing fringe benefits of part-tine and
full-time workers and finding part-time workers receive fewer benefits).
15. The other papers from this symposium include: Richard S. Belous, The Rise of the
Contingent Work Force: The Key Challenges and Opportunities, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv
863 (1995); Ann Bookman, Flexibility at What Price? The Costs of Part-Time Work for
Women Workers, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv 799 (1995); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, The Labor
Market Transformed: Adapting Labor and Employment Law to the Rise of the Contingent
WorkForce, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv 879 (1995); Gwen Thayer Handelman, On Our Own:
Strategiesfor Securng Health and Retirement Benefits in ContingentEmployment, 52 WASH.
& LEE L. REV 815 (1995); Jonathan P Hiatt, Policy Issues Concerningthe ContingentWork
Force, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv 739 (1995); Arne L. Kalleberg, Part-Time Work and
Workers in The United States: Correlatesand Policy Issues, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV 771
(1995); Edward A. Lenz, "Contingent" Work - Dispelling the Myth, 52 WASH. & LEE L.
REV 755 (1995); Mary E. O'Connell, Contingent Lives: The Economic Insecurity of
Contingent Workers, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv 889 (1995); Patricia Schroeder, Does the
Growth in the ContingentWork Force Demand a Change in Federal Policy', 52 WASH. &
LEE L. REv 731 (1995); Stewart J.Schwab, The Diversity of Contingent Workers and the
Need for Nuanced Policy, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv 915 (1995).
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offers, there is no justification for singling out contingent employment for
increased regulation.
The case for regulating the contingent employment market, assuming
one can generate a reasonable working definition, is weak at best. The
apparent negatives associated with contingent status are also negatives for
many who enjoy core status. Perhaps we should seriously consider
uncoupling benefits from employment altogether m order to avoid the double
threat of simultaneous loss of employment and benefits. For those unable
to obtain the basic mnmmum of benefits on an extra-employment basis,
vouchers or a like mechanism to enable low-income individuals to purchase
those benefits would seem to make sense.
III. Considenng Policy Issues
Professor Kalleberg correctly notes that some contingent workers
voluntarily choose this status while others do not.16 If the market is
dominated by people in the voluntary category, the case for regulating the
market is harder to make. As Professor Kalleberg notes, "If people
voluntarily choose to work part time, then presumably they are getting what
they want and there are fewer problems in need of legislative and regulatory
remedies."17 Involuntary contingent status is another matter. Thus, one
issue concerns the actual size of the mvoluntary contingent group. If
involuntariness is defined narrowly, the group may be insufficiently large to
warrant special regulation.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics attempts to determine what portion of
part-time workers are voluntary However, as Professor Kalleberg points
out, the voluntary category may be tainted by the presence of those who
are unable to work full time because of disability or lack of child care or
transportation.18 The important question remains whether to treat these
individuals as voluntary or mvoluntary contingent workers because the
size of the truly involuntary contingent work force has obvious implications for political judgments about the need for regulation. For example,
should a parent who works twenty hours per week because she has a young
child at home be classified as a voluntary part-time worker 9 How should
we classify a woman who would work forty hours per week if she could
find superior child care, but takes part-time employment because she
believes the available child care is only "adequate," and she does not want
16. Kalleberg, supra note 1, at 776-7
17 Id. at 793.
18. Id. at776-77

854
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to place her child there for extended periods of time? What about the
worker for whom the marginal cost of the additional care exceeds the extra
earnings she can generate with the additional commitment of time to the

work force?
Those familiar with the voluntary-involuntary debate regarding
work availability in unemployment compensation law no doubt hear familiar echoes. In the unemployment context, state officials have grappled

for ages with workers who claim they are involuntarily unavailable
for work because they lack transportation,

pursue an education full

time. 21

9

lack child care,

or want to

In order for a claimant to receive bene-

fits, state unemployment statutes generally require a showing that job
separation was either involuntary or with "good cause" and that the

claimant continues to be available for work. '

Not surprisingly, m a

decentralized system such as ours, the outcomes are mixed.
For
example, Massachusetts has taken the position that the loss of trans-

portation previously provided by a co-worker results m a personal, albeit
involuntary separation from employment which entitles a claimant to receive
benefits. 23 California has taken the position that a full-time law student
with children to care for is nonetheless "available" for paid work. 24 On
the other hand, Idaho and Minnesota have a conclusive presumption that
19 See Raytheon Co. v Director of Div of Employment Sec., 307 N.E.2d 330 (Mass.
1974) (finding woman who left work because of lack of transportation involuntarily
unavailable for work).
20. See Jones v Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 399 N.E.2d 844, 845
(Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (finding employee who terminated employment because changed work
hours conflicted with child-care responsibilities was not entitled to good-cause status because
employee agreed to change prior to termination); Gray v Dobbs House, Inc., 357 N.E.2d
900, 903-05 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (determining that parental obligations are not good cause
within meaning of Indiana unemployment benefits law).
21. See Glick v Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 591 P.2d 24, 28-29 (Cal. 1979)
(determining that claimant law student had good cause for not accepting work that conflicted
with school requirements).
22. Massachusetts, for example, requires an individual, inter alia, to "[b]e capable of,
available, and actively seeking work in his usual occupation or any other occupation for
which he is reasonably fitted" m order to be eligible for unemployment benefits. MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 151A, § 24(a) (West. Supp. 1994).
23. Raytheon Co. v Director of Div of Employment Sec., 307 N.E.2d 330 (Mass.
1974). For an excellent discussion of the varied treatment by the states of involuntary
separations, see Dahm & Fineshriber, Disqualificationfor Quits to Meet Family Obligations,
in 1 UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION: STUDIES AND RESEARCH 9, 13-14 (National
Commission on Unemployment Compensation 1980).
24. Glick v Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 591 P.2d 24 (Cal. 1979).
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full-time students are unavailable for work and therefore ineligible for
benefits.'
I have believed for some tume that a narrow construction of "involuntarness" would best serve the states m evaluating these kinds of unemployment cases. The same can be said for contingent employment claims. A
part-time worker who does not want to work full time because of a personal
circumstance beyond the control of the employer, such as child-care
responsibilities, transportation problems, or a decision to return to school,
ought to be placed squarely in the voluntary contingent category This is not
a political judgment designed to limit the number of involuntary contingent
workers. Rather, it is a practical decision that fairly reflects the wide range
of choices employees are free to make. For example, with respect to the
perennially touchy subject of child care, no one can seriously contend that
choosing to spend time caring for a small child is an involuntary act,
particularly in the qualified, post-Roe regime m which employers currently
operate. 6 Although Professor Kalleberg does not make an explicit claim for
including such persons in the "involuntary" category, others might wish to
do so. Labelling employment decisions influenced by personal choices about
transportation, children, and so forth "involuntary" is dangerous because the
"involuntary" label creates a class of "victims" whose "subordinated" status
is a function of purely voluntary decisions.
Several of Professor Kalleberg's other observations merit comment in
this context. The data on work as a central life interest,' earnmgs, 2s flexibility,29 union representation,' and reported effort are consistent with other
findings and with anecdotal sources. 3' Professor Kaleberg's finding that
25. See Idaho Dep't of Employment v Smith, 434 U.S. 100 (1977) (holding that
conclusive presumption that persons attending school other than night school are not
unemployed and thus cannot receive unemployment benefits does not violate Equal Protection
Clause of Fourteenth Amendment); Shreve v Dep't of Economic Sec., 283 N.W.2d 506
(Minn. 1979) (holding that irrebuttable presumption that students are unavailable for work
does not violate Due Process Clause of state or federal constitutions).
26. By this I simply mean to suggest that I am inclined to take pro-Roe, pro-choice
rhetoric seriously The decision to have a child, when one could opt instead to terminate a
pregnancy, should be respected as a voluntary choice, no different from any other.
27 Kalleberg, supra note 1, at 777-78.
28. Id. at 780-82.
29. Id. at 787

30. Id. at 791-92.
31. See, e.g., Conference on the Growing Contingent Workforce: Flexibility at the Price
of Fairness?:HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); Toward a Disposable Workforce: The
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more men than women view work as a "person's most important activity"
may account for the disproportionate number of women m the contingent
market.32 The General Social Survey data on earnings that Professor Kalleberg reviews is consistent with every other source that I know of in its conclusion that part-timers earn less than "core" workers.33 Some of the lower
earnings can be explained by the heavy concentration of part-timers in lowwage sectors of the economy - Dr. Kalleberg points to sales and food
service jobs.' Professor Kalleberg's data on flexibility, an attribute that he
describes as a "major advantage of part-time work, "3is similarly consistent.
It is not surprising that employers reward full-time employees with a
higher mean hourly wage 36 given the corresponding data on their higher
reported effort.37 Professor Kalleberg suggests that the difference in
reported effort between full- and part-time females "points to a drawback
of employers' reliance on part-time and other forms of contingent work.
The 'low road' approach to decreasing labor costs by reducing payroll may
lower worker effort, thereby resulting in less productivity and poorer
product quality ,38 If employers are indeed observing reduced rates of
productivity and poorer quality outputs from part-time workers, they may
implicitly incorporate the generally inferior work product of contingent
employees into the relative wage scales. However, employers may not
observe the reduced effort that employees report. In that case, there may be
a valid alternative explanation for the wage differential: In some cases the
lower wages paid to contingent workers are the functional equivalent of a
Increasing Use of "Contingent" Labor- Heanng on Examining the Use and Growth of a
"Contingent" Work Force in the United States, which Consists of Part Time, Temporary, and
Leased Employees, Including Independent Contractors, and Its Impact on the Nation's
Standardof Living, Productivity and Competitiveness Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); BUREAU OF
LABOR STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULLETIN No. 2441, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN SMALL
PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, 1992 (1994); BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
BULLETIN No. 2422, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN MEDIUM AND LARGE PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, 1991 (1993); Harrison, supra note 10; McClure, supra note 10.
32. Kalleberg, supra note 1, at 777-78 (noting that irrespective of full- or part-time
status, men were more likely than women to agree that work is person's most important
activity).
33. Id. at 780z82.
34. Id. at 780.
35. Id. at 787
36. 1d. at 780.
37 Id. at 790-91.
38. Id. at 791.
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submimmum training wage. 39 Some temporary agencies take on low-skill
workers, provide free training, and help "transition" them into "core"
employment. The cost of the training - both pre- and post-job placement may be reflected in the lower wage paid to the worker who is gaming skills
and experience.
IV Evaluating Specific Proposals
I take issue with Professor Kalleberg m those sections of hIs paper m
which he outlines the policy implications of the data he reviews. He
recognizes that contingent employment has both positive and negative aspects
and that it creates opportunities for flexibility for both parties. However, his
policy prescriptions focus on the negatives m a way that suggests that these
negatives are unique to contingent workers.
His specific proposals include: a substantial increase in the mmnmum
wage4" (to address the wage differential problem); legislation such as
Representative Schroeder's bill to prorate benefits to contingent workers4'
(to address the lack of benefits); and encouraging umons to organize
contingent workers (to address both the wage and benefit problems).42 The
explicit rationale for these proposals is to "make the option of creating
contingent part-time jobs more expensive for employers, "" and, in fairness,
the proposals appear to be designed to do just that.
However, his proposals may have some additional, unintended
consequences. For example, the Schroeder bill only requires that benefits
be offered to contingent workers if they are made available to core
workers. ' An employer who is required to offer prorated benefits consistent
with the Schroeder bill may opt to discontinue benefits for all employees.
39 This observation is based upon the author's discussions with personnel managers
at various temporary agencies. Symposium participants reported similar experiences at their
companies.
40. Kalleberg, supra note 1, at 794.
41. Id. at 795.
42. Id. at 797
43. Id. at 798.
44. See Part-Time and Temporary Worker Protection Act of 1993, H.R. 2188, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(b)(1)(B) (providing in part that "[t]he employer-provided premium under
a group health plan with respect to any employee for any period of coverage, after the
reduction permitted under section (a), shall not be less than a ratable portion of the employerprovided premium which would be provided undersuch planfor such period of coverage with

respect to an employee who completes 30 hours of service per week") (emphasis added). This
legislation treats 30 hours of work per week as full-time work. See d.
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If this were to happen, it is hard to see how any of the employees contingent or core - would be made better off.
Alternatively, an employer facing increased labor costs associated with
hiring contingent workers may do what Professor Kalleberg would like to
see done - reduce the number of contingent employees.45 There is no
guarantee, however, that the employer would substitute core workers for
contingent workers under these circumstances. If the employer did elect to
consolidate the work of several contingent employees into one core worker,
one must still inquire as to whether this is a desirable outcome. A conclusion that this is a superior outcome requires one to accept that the current
full-time employment of one core employee and the simultaneous unemployment of several formerly contingent employees are more attractive than the
contingent employment of all of them. Given how little we can say about the
subjective desirability of contingent employment, such a conclusion does not
appear warranted.
V Possible Justificationsfor a Nuanced Regulatory Impulse
There are three principal advantages of contingent workers to employers: lower payroll costs because of lower wages and benefits ineligibility;
tremendous flexibility regarding personnel and staffing needs without the
expense of cyclical hiring and lay-off periods; and reduced administrative
burdens associated with recruiting, training, and terminating employees and
with maintaining benefit and compensation plans. In pursuit of any or all of
these advantages, an employer may be influenced by the existing regulatory
framework, m particular the "trigger levels" in major employment legislation. The term "trigger level" refers to the nmmum number of employees
an employer must have for a particular statute to apply to the employer. For
example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applies only to employers with at least fifteen employees. 47 An employer seeking to avoid Title VII
coverage, thereby preserving the ability to discriminate on the basis of race,
color, sex, religion and national origin, might seriously consider hiring
contingent workers once there are thirteen or fourteen core employees.
Properly structured, the contingent workers would not "count" as employees
45.
46.
47
affecting

Kalleberg, supra note 1, at 798.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 &
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
interstate commerce with fifteen or more
employers - federal, state and local - as well."

Supp. V 1993).
"covers not only all private employers
employees, but also all governmental
SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MICHAEL C.

HARPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW GOVERNING THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP

25 (1990).
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for purposes of the statute, and the employer would remain free from Title
VII's dictates. The relatively new Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 4"
the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA),49 and the Age Discrimination

in Employment Act (ADEA)o are similarly susceptible to coverage avoidance via manipulation of the number of "employees." So long as an employer can plausibly assert that the employer has no "control" over a worker, the
employer is not employing that person, but merely contracting for services
with an independent agent."
Additionally, the existence or absence of a traditional ("core")
employment relationship affects liability under both the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) 2 and the various state workers' compensation
48. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993). The ADA provides that:
In general, the term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, except that, for
two years following the effective date of this subchapter, an employer means a
person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 25 or more employees
for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks m the current or
preceding year, and any agent of such person.
Id. § 12111(5)(A).
49. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2619, 2631-2636, 2651-2654 (Supp. V 1993). The FMLA
provides that "[tihe term 'employer' means any person engaged in commerce or mnany
industry or activity affecting commerce who employs 50 or more employees for each of 20
or more calendar workweeks inthe current or preceding calendar year." Id. § 2611(4)(A)(i).
50. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The ADEA provides that "[t]he
term 'employer' means a person engaged mnan industry affecting commerce who has twenty
or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year." Id. § 630(b).
51. As one practitioner has noted,
[a]ll modem day social and civil rights legislation governing the broad array of
legal obligations and duties owed by an employing entity to its employees can
directly be traced back to common law rules governing the "master/servant"
relationship. At common law, a "master" was defined as: A principal who
employs an agent to perform services and who controls or has the right to control
the conduct of the agent m the performance of those services. A "servant," in
turn, was defined as: An agent employed by a master to perform services and
whose conduct is controlled by the master or is subject to the right of control by
As a result, courts and administrative agencies charged with
the master.
enforcement of [employment] laws have continued to apply the common law "right
of control" test to determine whether an employer/employee relationship exists.
Kenneth R. Dolin, Hiring and Use of Temporary or Leased Employees: Practical and Legal
Considerations 4-5 (Nov. 8-9, 1994) (citations omitted) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Washington & Lee Law Review).
52. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
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acts. 3 For example, for businesses that use temporary or leased employees,
if both the leasing entity and the subscribing employer control wages and
terms and conditions of employment, either may be liable as an employer
under the NLRA.' 4 Indeed, several practitioners that I know routinely
advise clients to pay contingent workers a lower wage rate in part because
the wage distinction increases the likelihood of a nonjoint-employer finding.
The obligation to self-insure or obtain third-party coverage for workers'
compensation belongs to the core employer - that is, to the temporary
agency - not to the leasing employer.5' Thus, an employer may perceive
an ability to cut insurance costs by substituting contingent workers for core
workers. However, one would expect to see temporary agencies passing on
these costs to subscribing employers.
This discussion suggests that the existing regulatory climate in our labor
market may be partially responsible for the move away from the traditional
core employment relationship. If this is true, we ought to evaluate proposals
for additional regulation with extreme care. Instead of explicit increases in
the cost of hiring contingent workers - Professor Kalleberg's stated
agenda - we might first want to consider lowering the various trigger levels
in existing regulations. Such a measure would reduce the incentives to hire
contingent workers in order to maintain working environments infected by
bias. However, I am unaware of any data which purport to measure the
scope of the trigger-level problem. Researchers should address this question
before existing statutes are amended.
In addition, if one could document that employers are hiring contingent
workers in order to circumvent obligations under existing legislation, the
solution may lie in eliminating the opportunities for avoidance by removing
the current mandates which are imposed on employers. I emphasize that this
53. In general, employer liability is limited to injuries sustained by employees during the
course of their employment. In addition to independent contractors, who are not employees,
some states also exclude from workers' compensation act coverage, inter alia, employees of
charitable or religious employers, domestic servants, casual employees, and agricultural
workers. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN,ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW §§ 7 4-7.6 (1994).

54. See Southern Servs., Inc. v NLRB, 954 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1992) (sustaining
NLRB order that contracting employer cannot wholly restrict subcontract employee's right

to distribute union literature on contracting employer's premises).
55. State workers' compensation acts cover employees injured during the course of
employment; they do not cover leased employees or independent contractors. California, for
example, provides that "[I]iability for the compensation provided by this division
shall,
without regard to negligence, exist against an employer for any injury sustained by his or her
employees arising out of and in the course of the employment
" CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 3600(a) (West 1989).
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proposal remains a distinctly separate task from that proposed by Representative Schroeder. It is important to remember that neither contingent nor
core employees are entitled to nonmandated or discretionary employee
benefits such as health insurance. Forcing employers who opt to offer
certain nonmandated benefits to expand the pool of beneficiaries would lead
to a curious result: Only a portion of the core and contingent work force
would enjoy nonmandated benefits. One may properly infer from the
existence of, for example, the ADA and Title VII, that a national consensus
exists about the importance of bias-free workplaces - that is, about the
availability of employment without discrimination to all Americans. One
cannot draw the same conclusion about benefits from, for example, ERISA,56
which only applies to employers who on their own make the threshold
decision to offer health or pension plans.' This is a critical distinction. It
makes no sense to push for nonmandated benefits for contingent workers
while many core workers continue to do without these benefits themselves.
VI. Conclusion
The impulse to regulate perceived deficiencies in the labor market is
usually informed by the best of intentions - chiefly, a desire to improve the
lot of working people whose subordinated status is troubling. For example,
people (as opposed to labor umons)5" who favor periodic increases in the
minimum wage usually believe they can increase the wages of the working
poor without any disemployment effect. I suspect that the same kinds of
charitable concerns exist concerning contingent employment.
56. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988
& Supp. V 1993).
57 See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS COMMITTEE, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS LAw 19 (Steven J. Sacher et al. eds., 1991) (stating that ERISA applies to
established plans, funds, or programs).
58. Organized labor's long support for the minimum wage has been based on ripple
effects on its own wages:

The accepted political-economic theory of minimum wages is one based on the

intensity of preferences of the benefitting union sector and also those industrial
sectors whose technology uses relatively skilled labor. In both cases, consumer
substitution toward products produced by firms using low-productivity, low-wage
workers is limited by legally elevating the wages paid by these firms. Generally
these politically based, pressure-group explanations for the political popularity of

minimum wages are specific to the United States.
Keith B. Leffler, The Unanswered Question: Why are Minimum Wages Popularwith the
Poor?, in THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL MINIMUM WAGES 531, 532 (Simon Rottenberg ed.,
1981).
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In summary, there are several problems with increasing the cost of
hiring contingent employees. The definition of who is a contingent employee is insufficiently precise. Most core employees have no more job
protection or right to nonmandated benefits than the typical contingent
worker. Many contingent employees may voluntarily choose contingent
status and we know little about the relative sizes of the voluntary/hugh-end
and involuntary/low-end contingent markets. Contingent workers' lower
wages may be operating as a subminimum training wage in some cases.
Finally, it is not at all clear that employers will convert contingent workers
to core workers if the benefits differentials are eliminated.
These problems imply the need for a cautionary impulse to act as a
counterweight to the regulatory impulse. No one benefits from a simple
increase in the cost of hiring contingent workers. Unless the increased cost
translates into concrete improvement in the' lives of the affected employees
in the form of increased job security, wages, and the like, it is meaningless.
At this point we do not have evidence sufficient to make the case for
regulating the market for contingent employment.

